For a mild-mannered Prime Minister who leads a government dependent on external support for survival, Manmohan Singh is demonstrating obduracy of a strange and unreasonable kind. His current posture of ‘I-must-have-the-nuclear-deal-or-I-go’ suggests that the political objective of completing the elected term of the United Progressive Alliance regime has been subordinated to the greater goal of seeing the deal through. And herein lies a fatal contradiction. The guaranteed way of sinking the civilian nuclear deal, which this newspaper has editorially endorsed with some caveats, is for the government to go down, taking the 123 with it. What should be clear to anyone who is not on a high horse, with blinkers, is that given the deep political polarisation there is little chance of any other Prime Minister or government making a go of this deal in the conceivable future.

For at least two years now, Dr. Singh has been passionate in his conviction that the civilian nuclear deal he initiated with President George Bush in July 2005 was not just in the interest of India’s nuclear programme, which had suffered from a harsh international regime of sanctions and technology denial; it was a supreme national necessity because “nuclear power is critical to our energy security if we want to be a world power” (as he put it in a recent interview). This conviction has been, by the Prime Minister’s own admission, linked to the ideological belief that the United States wanted to help India become a great power; that “of all the U.S. Presidents,” George Bush was “the friendliest towards India”; and that “in a globalised world, Indo-U.S. relations were the key and we needed to give them the highest importance.” But the UPA government finds itself in a hopeless minority in Parliament on this critical issue. There is also considerable opposition outside Parliament, with the community of scientists and the intelligentsia divided down the middle and the public mood uncertain.

“A Country is Not a Company,” argued Paul Krugman in a celebrated 1996 paper published in the Harvard Business Review. He made the point that “the style of thinking necessary for economic analysis is very different from that which leads to success in business” and further that a failure to understand this can lead to disastrous mistakes. The economist in Dr. Singh needs to realise that arguments drawing from ‘decarbonising the economy’ exercises done in the Planning Commission combining with ill-founded ambitions of becoming a great power by becoming the sole superpower’s camp follower are likely to flop in the democratic political arena. It may be perfectly true that the Bharatiya Janata Party is the co-progenitor of this nuclear deal. But the reality is that the principal opposition party has aggressively attacked the deal as a sell-out of national interests, and specifically of the country’s ambition of developing “a minimum credible nuclear deterrent.” Its leaders are salivating at the thought of this Congress-led regime falling on so sensitive an issue. As important politically is the nature of opposition from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and its left partners whose bloc of 61 MPs provide life support for the UPA government. The CPI(M) has made it clear that it has serious problems with some of the specifics of the 123 read along with the Hyde Act and has asked the government not to go ahead even with the next step towards operationalisation. But its larger political objection is that the nuclear deal is part of a strategic alliance with the U.S. encompassing political, economic, and military aspects; and therefore has “adverse consequences for an independent foreign policy, sovereignty, and the economic interests of the people.” And the Manmohan Singh regime knows it will get no quarter from the recently formed ‘third force’ bloc, the UNPA.

So for reasons analogous to why a country is not a company, this minority government must understand the difference between economic and technical analysis — which, in the eyes of critics, basically relies on showing how nuclear power’s 3 per cent contribution to India’s overall energy production can be raised to 7 per cent by 2020 — and what makes for sustainable political success. Non-transparency, which has been in evidence for much of the time this nuclear deal has been in process, has taken its toll of political and public support; and unprincipled compromises such as the U.S.-coerced ganging up against Iran in the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency and deepening military relations with the U.S. have had their influence on political perceptions of the 123 agreement.

The way to resolve the present political crisis is for the UPA government to put the 123 on hold, and for the Congress party and its allies to persuade Prime Minister Singh, who continues to command wide respect in India and abroad, not to be inflexible. The government can pursue the deal by scheduling an earnest round of all-party discussions, which must take in objections, apprehensions, reservations, and questions relating to the nuclear deal that have come from all serious quarters. False notions of prestige and credibility, within India and internationally, must not be allowed to come in the way of this larger political necessity. There is nothing sacrosanct about the timeline indicated for the final three steps in the nuclear deal. President Bill Clinton did not resign or even go into a deep sulk when one of his key projects, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, was rejected 51-48 by the U.S. Senate in October 1999. The CTBT — which opened for signature more than a decade ago and has been signed by 177 countries and ratified by 139 of them — has not yet been enabled to enter into force but there are hopes of reviving it. Heavens will not fall if the 123 agreement is put on hold and all the issues opened up for discussion. There is a risk that it may fall by the wayside but that is clearly worth taking, especially if the risk is measured against the virtual certainty of the nuclear deal being buried if the UPA government falls.

Related posts:

1. Nuke test by India w ill kill deal, says US MFA refutes statement, says testing is India’s prerogative Nilova Roy...
2. Labor to scrap Uranium deal with India: Kevin Rudd By Neeraj Nanda Melbourne: Australia’s decision to export Uranium to...
3. India-US rift over N-deal continues, gaps remain New Delhi: The US and India have failed to resolve...
4. India’s 61 st Independence Day Celebrations (Aug. 15, 2007) The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh arriving at Red Fort...
5. Karat explains stand on Indo-US N-deal in article By RAMESH RAMACHANDRAN New Delhi, Aug. 18: CPI(M) general secretary...